

ANNOUNCEMENT: Below is the text of the first issue of "Azerbaijan in the World," a biweekly online publication of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Future issues will feature articles, interviews, book reviews and chronologies, and its editors welcome both comments and articles (up to 2,000 words in length) from all those interested in Azerbaijan and its foreign relations. ADA is sending this to you in the hopes that you will find it interesting and useful. If you wish to unsubscribe or submit an article or comment, please send an email to adabiweekly@ada.edu.az

AZERBAIJAN IN THE WORLD
A Bi-Weekly Newsletter of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 1, 2008)

adabiweekly@ada.edu.az

In this issue:

- Greetings from the Foreign Minister
- Greetings from the Rector

- Paul Goble, "Azerbaijan on the Cusp"
- Sevinge Yusifzade, "A Not So Distant Model"
- Murad Ismayilov, "Azerbaijani National Identity and Baku's Foreign Policy"

- A Chronology of Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

- Note to Readers

Greetings from
H.E. Elmar Mammadyarov
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Azerbaijan

I am delighted to welcome you to the pages of *Azerbaijan in the World*, the new biweekly of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy.

Given its booming economy, increasing presence in international affairs and growing prestige, Azerbaijan today deserves your attention, and I am confident that this new electronic publication will serve as a useful guide to its foreign policy.

Situated in one of the most geopolitically sensitive regions in the world, my country affects and is affected by various regional trends, energy issues, and security threats, and in order to understand where Baku is heading, you will want to keep track of developments in all these areas. And *Azerbaijan in the World* will thus feature articles on those issues as well.

Because Ambassador Pashayev, the rector of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, and Paul Goble, ADA's director of research and publications, stand behind this project, I have every confidence in its success.

I plan to be an attentive reader as well as a frequent contributor and very much hope you will both as well.

**Greetings from
Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev
Rector
Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy**

As the rector of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, I want to echo the words of Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov about our new biweekly, "Azerbaijan in the World" and take this opportunity to tell you something about our institution, its activities, and its goals.

Created by President Ilham Aliyev in March 2006, the ADA has already made enormous strides toward becoming a place for training the next generation of Azerbaijani and other foreign affairs practitioners, an international center for scholars to conduct research and share their knowledge with ADA's students and each other, and a model for the transformation of higher education in Azerbaijan.

Our Academy consists of three components: an academic division offering certificates and a master of arts in diplomacy and international affairs, a training center for Azerbaijanis and others already working in foreign affairs, and a research council that will help us select staff from around the world and guide our research and publications effort.

Because our government has decided to nearly double the number of its missions abroad over the next several years, we are currently focusing on training young people to help staff and support our embassies and their important work. But as the launch of this publication shows, we have not forgotten our other goals.

ADA already has cooperation agreements with leading institutions in Europe and the United States. We have formed the nucleus of a faculty whose members have international reputations. We will soon announce our first research and training grants. We have begun our program of special training courses. And we will launch our full-scale MA program in the 2008/2009 academic year. And most visibly of all, we will soon break ground for the construction of what will become our permanent campus in a beautiful park near the center of Baku.

In recognition of its growing role internationally, we at ADA use English in all our courses and publications, a practice that we are confident will not only help prepare our students for their future work but also allow us to attract students and faculty from around the world and to involve an ever widening circle of scholars and practitioners in our activities.

I very much hope you will find "Azerbaijan and the World" useful, but even more I hope that you will join our dialogue about the future by sending us your comments about its content and your essays for inclusion in future issues.

AZERBAIJAN ON THE CUSP: ACHIEVEMENTS OF 2007, CHALLENGES OF 2008

Paul Goble
Director of Research and Publications
Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

Azerbaijan was extraordinarily successful in its foreign relations last year, and many have suggested that there is every reason for it to be even more so in 2008. While that is possible, both the successes it had in 2007 and the specific features of the international landscape of the coming year mean that Baku now faces far greater challenges ahead than it did in the past, challenges that if met will boost Azerbaijan into a new and higher place among the countries of the world but if not recognized and acted upon could easily call into question much of what it has achieved.

Even to list Azerbaijan's most signal achievements in 2007 is to be impressed by what its government and people have been able to do: the fastest growing economy in the world according to the World Bank, the signing of an accord linking Azerbaijan to the West by rail and the coming on line of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the hosting of Turkic leaders in Baku, the completion of its presidency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the involvement of Poland and Japan in GUAM under its chairmanship, an expansion in the activities of the Economic Cooperation Organization, a bid for the Olympic Games, increased diplomatic influence in key countries and the United Nations, and the announcement of plans to expand the number of its missions abroad.

Last year was marked as well by more visits by Azerbaijan's president and senior leaders to other countries and more visits by senior officials to Azerbaijan than had been the case earlier. Such visits became so common that they were viewed as something entirely expected, as "part of the furniture." Indeed, in 2007, Baku has become a regular stopping point for the leaders of other nations and international institutions, not a place they visit only once or not at all.

Equally important in the short term and perhaps more significant in the years ahead, Baku dramatically expanded its ties with the millions of Azerbaijanis living beyond its borders. In December, Azerbaijanis in more than 70 countries around the world took part in celebrations of their continuing ties to their homeland. As a result, Baku now has some important new allies in other countries. It does not yet have the same influence some other diasporas have, but for the first time, Azerbaijan can participate in this competition.

And in addition to these and many other accomplishments, over the course of the last 12 months, Azerbaijan assumed a growing role in the international fight against terrorism, providing troops for battles abroad, information about terrorist activities in its neighborhood, and demonstrating its capacity to interdict threats to foreign missions on its territory. The last of these steps was especially important. It underscored Azerbaijan's maturation as a state, and together with everything else, it is why analysts in both Baku and Washington identified 2007 as the best year ever in Azerbaijani-American relations.

Baku then used these enhanced ties to work with its friends in the U.S. Congress and the White House to force the State Department to edit a document that tilted against Baku, and it showed growing diplomatic skill in its negotiations with the Russian Federation, the Minsk Group, and the countries of the region. Even if Azerbaijan did not achieve all its goals –

especially the liberation of the occupied territories – it laid the groundwork for doing so by developing the most sophisticated multi-channel diplomacy in its post-Soviet history.

In short, as the calendar turned from 2007 to 2008, the government and people of Azerbaijan had much to be pleased about. Such good feelings are not misplaced. But there are three sets of reasons – some related to developments inside Azerbaijan, others reflecting the political calendars of other countries, and still additional ones that are the direct product of what Baku achieved last year – that mean 2008 will be a more challenging and potentially fateful year than the one just past.

First, Azerbaijan faces a presidential election. Regardless of how certain many are that President Ilham Aliyev will win that vote, the campaign will generate much discussion about what Baku has done in the world and where it should be headed diplomatically, and the aftermath will likely be occasion for changes in one or more key positions in the government. Both of these inevitably complicate the lives of those engaged in foreign policy, undercutting the certainties of continuity that allow the careful planning successful diplomacy normally requires.

Moreover, both the campaign and Azerbaijan's recent diplomatic successes are likely to lead some Azerbaijanis to demand more changes at home or a redirection of its diplomatic efforts to those issues – first and foremost the recovery of the occupied territories – that most excite the public. Demands for changes at home will mean that Azerbaijan's top leaders will have less time to focus on foreign affairs and thus be less willing to take on new initiatives in the short term. And calls by politicians and the public for a focus on the recovery of the occupied territories will, as one American official described the impact of the Middle East on the Bush Administration's foreign affairs, "suck all the air" out of everything else.

And finally, among the domestic changes ahead that will make the prosecution of foreign policy more difficult is one that is more diffuse but perhaps even more significant. That is the revolution of rising expectations that Baku's diplomatic ascent has sparked among Azerbaijanis. Given the success their country has had in the last year, many are certain to demand that it be even more successful in the future. Not only can that make judicious decisions on what the government should do more difficult, but it can lead to the kind of overreaching that is often fatal to diplomatic work.

Second, there are some important changes abroad that will affect Baku's ability to advance diplomatically. Azerbaijan is not the only country with elections this year. Georgia already has had such a vote, and in coming months, the Russian Federation, the United States, and Armenia will conduct them as well, with a change at the top nearly certain in all three. Such turnover will make it more difficult for these countries to engage diplomatically for the same reasons that the election in Azerbaijan will have that effect here. And while this turbulence might offer some short term opportunities, it more likely will lead to a slowdown in activity as these countries too go into a wait-and-see mode.

In addition, the international economic situation in the year ahead is likely to be increasingly problematic. Not only will an economic slowdown in the United States and several other countries have an impact on demand for Azerbaijan's chief export, but shifts in the relative economic position of the major players in international trade will force Baku to look in some new and unexpected directions, again changes that will require careful consideration and thus likely lead to a pause in some sectors of diplomatic activity.

And there are the uncertainties of conflict in the Middle East. Continuing fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the possibility of a military confrontation with Iran, and the all too real threat

that the world will not be able to get through another year without the kind of terrorist attack that will suddenly reorder the diplomatic map are going to complicate the lives of Azerbaijan's foreign and security policy elites. Depending on how things develop in this regard, Baku may find itself under pressure to do more from its foreign partners or pushed by its own elites and people to change course in order to minimize the impact of these dangers on the country's domestic life.

And third, as so often in life, Baku's signal achievements in recent years and especially in 2007 have brought in their wake some new problems. In addition to greater expectations at home for uninterrupted success, there are three that Azerbaijan will have to face this year and well into the future. First of all, as Azerbaijan has become more important internationally, it has generated expectations in many capitals that it will be able to carry an ever greater part of the load of the work of the international community. That puts enormous pressure on its inevitably limited diplomatic capacity. More and more often, other countries will want Azerbaijan to participate or take the lead in one or another sphere. Baku will have to make choices, and those choices in turn will be limited unless it both expands its capacity and develops a more coherent national security and foreign policy apparatus.

That is not something that is going to be easy to do especially in the short term: It takes decades to "grow" an ambassador or a national security advisor, and unfortunately given its impressive recent successes, Azerbaijan does not have that much time before it must field a much larger foreign policy team.

Second, not all of Azerbaijan's neighbors or interlocutors are entirely happy about Baku's diplomatic ascent. Some like Turkey may welcome it, but others have more negative views and are certain to become more active both diplomatically and in other ways. Neither Yerevan, Tehran nor Moscow is entirely happy about Azerbaijan's achievements. And all of them have levers they can employ against Baku, some of them diplomatic, some economic, and some involving other means.

Countering those efforts without falling into carefully laid traps designed to make Azerbaijan look incompetent, authoritarian or paranoid will not be easy.

And third, and this may prove to be the most difficult challenge, although it is one that many Azerbaijanis already understand and know what to do. As an increasingly significant player in international affairs, Azerbaijan will attract more attention from other countries and from their media. Much of this expanded coverage will be positive and welcome, but some of it could be negative and harmful.

In the past, the Azerbaijani government could take actions at home relatively confident that few abroad would pay attention. Now, as Baku has risen in prominence and as the international media have gone global 24/7, it does not have that luxury. If they take an action at home that governments or human rights activists elsewhere believe is a violation of fundamental human rights, the government and people of Azerbaijan are going to suffer politically and diplomatically as a result.

On the one hand and most immediately, Azerbaijan's diplomats must become more skillful in explaining what is taking place in their country and capable of responding to the inevitable criticism important countries attract. But on the other, Baku needs to recognize, as the recent criticism of certain actions against journalists showed, that its success in the world will depend not only on the skill of those at the top and in the foreign ministry but also on the way in which the Azerbaijani officials at all levels act.

If Azerbaijan's leaders and people recognize these challenges and act in ways that will allow Baku to present the best possible face to the world, there is every chance that Azerbaijan will continue its march from the margins of the international community to the very first ranks. But if its leaders and people are not able to do so, then Azerbaijan will face the prospect that it will not be able to do so, however many friends it has attracted so far and however much oil it may be able to export now and in the future.

The year ahead thus promises to be even more interesting than the one just past. Azerbaijan is clearly on the cusp of great things, with the possibility for further progress very real but the downside risks to its newly won status equally and all too obviously present.

**A NOT SO DISTANT MODEL:
THE AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 1918-1920
AND BAKU'S POST-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY**

Sevinge Yusifzade
Professor of History
Baku State University

I met with a very dignified and interesting group of gentlemen from Azerbaijan, men who spoke the same language I did about ideals and concepts of liberty, rights and justice.

--Woodrow Wilson
President of the United States
May 1919

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Azerbaijan had a distinct advantage compared to most of the other "new" states when it came to developing its foreign policies. It could look back to the first Azerbaijan republic of 1918-1920 for a model of how they should proceed, something many of its leaders and people did because to an uncanny degree, post-Soviet Azerbaijan faced many of the same challenges and opportunities that republic faced during its brief existence more than 70 years earlier.

Indeed, Azerbaijan's post-Soviet leaders have been explicit about the impact of that experience on the decisions they have taken. The late President Heydar Aliyev frequently said that Baku's policies now must reflect "the history and national traditions" of the Azerbaijani people, including those manifested in the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR). Consequently, anyone interested in Azerbaijan's foreign policy now must begin by examining the ADR's diplomatic activities, carefully separating the realities of that time from the myths that have grown up around it.

On May 28, 1918, the leaders of Azerbaijan declared their independence from Soviet Russia and the formation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. They expected that the United States and the other great powers would quickly recognize them because most of those behind the declaration had been inspired to take this step by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points speech in which he had proclaimed support for the right of all peoples to national self-determination. Moreover, they believed that the secular, democratic political system their

country was creating would be especially attractive to the European and American governments. And the ADR's leadership was confident that recognition would lead to the kind of support that would guarantee their independence.

But such recognition did not come as the ADR leaders expected, and as many of the most thoughtful in Baku recognized even then but some do not even now, it would not have been the solution to all their problems even if it had. Instead, they found themselves forced to get involved in the complicated and often trying business of diplomacy, untying the bonds which had linked them to the crumbling Russian empire, establishing relations with various neighbors, and seeking a place in the international system that would best help the people of Azerbaijan to have a better life – all at a time of great uncertainty and from a position of weakness relative to many of the other players.

Like any new country, Azerbaijan in 1918 faced three interrelated sets of extraordinarily difficult problems: sorting out the problems with neighboring states arising from the collapse of an empire, recruiting a diplomatic corps to implement its national goals abroad, and attracting the attention of the great powers and securing their recognition and support. In each of these cases, the ADR made some remarkable progress even though it lasted only two years as the result of an act of *force majeure* by Soviet Russia.

Coping with challenges like defining borders or dividing property when an empire collapses and setting up relations with the former imperial center when other countries are going through the same process and with other neighbors who did not expect to have new ones was the first set of challenges the new ADR had to face. Given that it had to address these issues during a period of enormous instability and from a place where some of the other countries involved were hostile and aggressive, the ADR did remarkably well.

On the negative side, Baku never overcame the unwillingness of Soviet Russia to acknowledge its independence, a failure that ultimately presaged the invasion of the Red Army and the extinction of the ADR. Nor did it overcome the hostility and aggressiveness of the Armenians, who were never prepared to cooperate with Azerbaijan even when the Americans worked to mediate the dispute between the two countries and whose invasion seriously weakened the ADR. Indeed, at the time of the Soviet invasion, most Azerbaijani troops were arrayed not on the northern border but along the Armenian front.

But on the positive side, not only is it unlikely that diplomacy alone could have changed that situation in any fundamental way, but within that difficult environment, the ADR did manage to develop close cooperative relations with Georgia, quickly agreeing on borders and the division of property, creating a postal-telegraph union and reaching an agreement on tariffs and railroads, working to promote greater cooperation in the Southern Caucasus despite Yerevan's opposition when the Western powers called on the countries of the region to do so, and even forming a military alliance when threatened by General Denikin's anti-Bolshevik White Army.

Azerbaijan faced an equally mixed picture in dealing with its two largest neighbors that had not been part of the Russian Empire: Turkey and Persia. Turkey was an enthusiastic supporter of Azerbaijan, but like many such backers, it wanted to exert more influence on the internal life of the ADR than that country's leadership were prepared to accept. And consequently, with this closest friend, Azerbaijani diplomats frequently had to work to get Turkey to be less involved rather than more.

Dealing with Persia was far more difficult. Not only were its rulers suspicious of the ADR's possible links to the ethnic Azerbaijanis in the northwestern portion of the country, but

Tehran had designs on parts of Azerbaijan itself. That situation makes the achievement of Baku's diplomats there all the more important. After an ADR delegation visited Tehran in March 1919, the two sides agreed to hold a conference beginning in December of that year which resulted in an accord on trade.

The ADR achieved its greatest success in creating a diplomatic corps from scratch. It attracted intellectuals and businessmen who quickly demonstrated a natural gift for diplomacy. The ADR recruited the distinguished writer Chemenzemenli to go to Ukraine, and its delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, led by Ali Topchibashev, who was supported by M.G. Gajinsky, M.Mir-Mekhtiyev and D. Gajibekov, was skilled enough to impress Woodrow Wilson as the epigraph to this article attests even if the constellation of forces working on him and on the leaders of the other major powers did not allow them to achieve their goal.

Despite their efforts, the ADR was not able to achieve the diplomatic recognition it hoped for. There were many reasons for this. First of all, the situation on the ground in the Caucasus was far from clear. There were White Armies, Red Armies, and the armies of the newly emerged states. In this situation, even those like the British who did not want to see a united Russia emerge again, felt it was best to wait.

Lord Curzon, the British foreign secretary at the time, famously observed that "we are not obligated to recognize all small countries immediately." While many people have extrapolated his comment to apply to a wide range of situations, Curzon made it at a time when it was unclear whether the White Russian army would win and thus European countries would not want to undercut it by recognizing new states on its borders or whether the Red Army would win and the West would have good reason to limit its influence. In the event, of course, by taking this wait-and-see attitude, the European powers provided an opening for the latter while doing little to help the former.

Second, most of the major powers represented at Versailles had been approached by Armenians or missionaries who recounted the sufferings of that community in the Ottoman Empire. In many cases, these people did not make a clear distinction between that state and Turkey or even between both of them and Azerbaijan. As a result, and in an entirely unfair way, Azerbaijan was tarred with a very broad brush.

And third, the United States and its president were conflicted in their thinking. Wilson remained committed to self-determination but he did not want to see a world consisting of a large number of small states. His own utopianism led him to push for a Transcaucasian Confederation or even a "neutral zone" there under an American "governor general," even though the U.S. was not prepared to send the number of troops needed to make that happen. And he was caught between those who wanted to develop good relations with Azerbaijan because of its oil and those who accepted Armenian attacks at face value.

These internal conflicts were directly reflected in Wilson's dealings with the Azerbaijani delegation. On the one hand, he met that delegation before he met any other, a signal honor, and was impressed by what its members had to say. But on the other, he was not prepared to offend the French or anger the Armenian diaspora by moving quickly to extend to the ADR the diplomatic recognition it so urgently sought and so obviously needed.

Even if that recognition had been extended, however, it is very unlikely that it would have altered the course of events. Soviet Russia almost certainly would not have been put off by the presence of a few Western diplomats once it was in a position to take back that which it

believed was its territory by right. But many Azerbaijanis thought otherwise, a view that reflected the notion that diplomatic ties could invariably trump other kinds of power.

During the first 18 months of its existence, the ADR took concrete steps to establish diplomatic ties of various degrees of closeness with Georgia, Persia, and Turkey. It set up consulates in Tabriz and five other cities in Persia, in Batumi in Georgia, in Crimea in Ukraine, and in Ashgabat in Turkmenistan. And on April 22, 1920, the ADR parliament adopted a law on the creation of diplomatic missions in the major countries of Europe, the United States, and Soviet Russia, even though it had not yet reached accord with these states. Moreover, the parliament voted to replace the diplomatic mission to the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles with missions to the governments of the countries that had taken part in the talks.

But this action became moot less than a week later when the Red Army of Soviet Russia crossed Azerbaijan's northern border, extinguishing the ADR as a subject of international law. Although the ADR lasted only two years, its actions, especially in the diplomatic area, were so impressive that 71 years later they provided instruction to the leaders of the Republic of Azerbaijan on how best to proceed in what is still a dangerous and uncertain world. And consequently, those hard-won lessons have already put post-Soviet Azerbaijan on the road not only to survive but to prosper for a long time to come.

**AZERBAIJANI NATIONAL IDENTITY
AND BAKU'S FOREIGN POLICY:
THE CURRENT DEBATE**

Murad Ismayilov
Projects Coordinator & Research Fellow
Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

Ever since Azerbaijan regained its independence in 1991, there has been an intense debate among scholars, officials and ordinary Azerbaijanis over how the country should define itself. And while such discussions are taking place in other former Soviet republics, those in Azerbaijan have been particularly intense, especially because there is a widespread consensus in Baku that how Azerbaijan defines itself will determine what kind of a foreign policy it pursues. Consequently, a brief review of the current state of this debate is important both intellectually and politically.

Many of the debate participants, both in Azerbaijan and abroad, have stressed the important role that the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) has played in shaping the identity of Azerbaijan today (Suleymanov 2001; Altstadt 2002; Swietochowski 1985). They point to the ADR's commitment to building a modern democratic society, with free and fair elections, proportional representation, and universal adult suffrage (Asgharzadeh 2007; Altstadt 2002; Volkhonski and Mukhanov 2007, p. 148). Indeed, Azerbaijani commentators note with pride that Azerbaijan was "the first country in the history of Islamic nations ever to enfranchise women" and that it did so even before the United States (Asgharzadeh 2007, p. 9).

A second legacy of the ADR was a commitment to form a new and uniform national identity based on "Azerbaijanism," which Mustafa-zade (2006, p. 106) has defined as "a synthesis of principles of Turkism, Islamism, and modernism, that is, a non-contradictory amalgam of ethnic, confessional and European heritage of Azerbaijanis". All these forces, Swietochowski (1985) argues, were present during Azerbaijan's national awakening, none so

dominant that Azerbaijanis could ignore the others, and the ADR leadership explicitly chose Azerbaijanism over Turkism. Atabaki's (2002) account of the failure of pan-Turkism in pre-Soviet Azerbaijan and the broader region is suggestive on this point.

According to Asgharzadeh (2007), the multiple sources of Azerbaijanism, especially as developed by President Heydar Aliyev, served as a guarantee that after the recovery of independence, the country would have an identity based on citizenship rather than ethnicity, culture or religion, something that sets it apart from many other countries in the region. Other writers – Shaffer (2002, p. xii), Suleymanov (2001 and 2004, p. 22) and Priego (2005) make similar points.

But at the same time, scholars like Altstadt (1998 and 2002) stress that as important as the legacy of the ADR has been, a variety of other factors are at work, given the “deep gulf” separating the first republic and the current one. The leaders of the former “were products of 19th century European thought,” while “today’s leadership, in and outside government, grew up under Soviet rule” and were profoundly affected by its efforts to russify the population and wipe out the influence of religion.

Suleymanov (2001 and 2004, p. 5) concurs, saying that because of Soviet “ideological domination” and Moscow’s massive efforts at cultural and linguistic engineering (including alphabet reforms), the “direct extrapolation” of Azerbaijan’s pre-Soviet identity “has not been as helpful as it was hoped.” Hence, Suleymanov (2001) and other writers have pointed to other intervening developments as defining factors: the rise of the Turkish republic, the Caucasus environment (also Tokluoglu 2005, p. 733), the “two Azerbaijanians” (also Shaffer 2002; Hajizade 1998; Tokluoglu 2005, pp.728-729), the war with Armenia (also Altstadt 1992; de Waal 2003; Tokluoglu 2005, pp. 725-727; Priego 2005, p. 9), Black January of 1990 (also Tokluoglu 2005, p. 727), the influx of refugees and the emergence of a culture of victimization, and Western influence associated with the development of Caspian energy resources.

In the course of the 1990s, Azerbaijani leaders in their search for identity selectively drew on both the ADR and Soviet-period legacies. Under President Abulfaz Elchibey, Baku defined its language as Turkish, thus stressing one set of pre-Soviet values, but his successor President Heydar Aliyev, picking up on the Soviet decision in 1937 to call the people and language of the republic “Azerbaijani” rather than “Turkish” opted for Azerbaijani. (For a discussion of these changes, see Altstadt 1998; Hajizade 1998; Tokluoglu 2005, pp. 742, 754).

As important as these decisions were, they did not end the debate on the nature of Azerbaijani identity and its proper application. Mutalibov attempted to redefine it in a way that would support a pro-Moscow foreign policy. Elchibey tilted toward Turkism to support a pro-Western and anti-Russian approach. And more recently, both President Heydar Aliyev and President Ilham Aliyev have invoked Azerbaijanism as the foundation of a more balanced foreign policy. And this evolution in and of itself has sparked more discussion about the specific content of that idea at the beginning of the 21st century.

Such selectivity in the meaning of Azerbaijani identity or, one might say, its lack of a precise definition, affects Azerbaijanis at all levels. Tokluoglu (2005) and Hajizade (1998) have explored these tensions in the programs and agendas of Azerbaijani political parties. And Tokluoglu (2005, esp. p. 728) has pointed to the tensions among the Azerbaijanism which has been accepted by the governing New Azerbaijan Party, Turkism, an ethnocentric nationalism that informed the thinking of the Popular Front, and liberal nationalism of the Musavat Party.

Many scholars have discussed Azerbaijani identity, but three in particular – Houman (2003), Suleymanov (2004) and Priego (2005) – have specifically focused on the impact that identity has had on Baku's foreign policy.

While his was a pioneering work in employing internal variable-based explanation of foreign policy decision making in Azerbaijan, Houman did not treat constructed identity as an independent variable. Suleymanov went further, discussing the ways in which identity issues define domestic politics and those then play a role in defining foreign ones, but like Houman, he did not discuss more direct linkages between identity and foreign policy.

Priego's work thus represents an important breakthrough, albeit one not without some important limitations. He focused on the ways Azerbaijani national identity has shaped the country's foreign policy choices, but his study addressed only the thinking of the leaderships of the New Azerbaijan and Musavat parties, thus limiting the value of his conclusion and preventing him from examining the impact of broader, if more diffuse understandings of Azerbaijanism and its alternatives.

Thus, this debate will go on, and future issues of "Azerbaijan and the World" will include reviews on the latest research in this area as well as that on a wide variety of other issues in Azerbaijani foreign policy and international relations.

Sources:

Altstadt, Audrey L. (1992). *The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian Rule*, Hoover Institute Press, May.

Altstadt, Audrey L. (1998). "Azerbaijan's First and Second Republics: The Problem of National Consciousness", *Caspian Crossroads Magazine*, Volume 3, Issue No. 4, Spring.

Altstadt, Audrey L. (2002). "Visions and Values: Roots of Today's Society in the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic", *Caspian Crossroads Magazine*, Volume 6, Issue No. 1, Fall/Winter.

Asgharzadeh, Alireza (2007). 'In Search of a Global Soul: Azerbaijan and the Challenge of Multiple Identities', *MERLA*, Vol. 11, No. 4, December.

Atabaki, Touraj (2002). 'Recasting and Recording Identities in the Caucasus', *Iran & the Caucasus*, Vol. 6, No. ½, pp. 219-235.

Cornell, Svante (2001). *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, January.

Houman, Sadri (2003). 'Elements of Azerbaijan Foreign Policy', *Journal of Third World Studies*, Spring.

Priego, Alberto Moreno (2005). 'The Creation of the Azerbaijani Identity and Its Influence on Foreign Policy', *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, University of Madrid, May.

Shaffer, Brenda (2002). *Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity*, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Suleymanov, Elin (2001). 'Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis and the Search for Identity', *Analysis of Current Events*, Volume 13, No. 1, February.

Suleymanov, Elin (2004). 'Emergence of New Political Identity in the South Caucasus', *Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis*, The Fletcher School, May.

Swietohowski, Tadeusz (1985). *Russian Azerbaijan. 1905-1920. The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tokluoglu, Ceylan (2005). 'Definitions of National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnicity in post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1990s', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4, July, pp. 722-758.

Waal, Thomas de (2003). *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*, New York: New York University Press, May.

Волхонский, Михаил и Вадим Муханов (2007). *По следам Азербайджанской Демократической Республики*, Москва: "Европа".

Гаджи-заде, Хикмет (1998). "Новая идентичность для нового Азербайджана", *Центральная Азия и Кавказ*, № 14.

Мустафа-заде, Рахман (2006). *Две Республики. Азербайджано-российские отношения в 1918-1922 гг.*, Москва: "МИК".

A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

1. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

In his New Year's message to the nation, President Ilham Aliyev says that the country has a bright future and that any ethnic Armenians in Karabakh who want to establish their country should go elsewhere to do so. (www.day.az/news/society/103029.html)

In other speeches in January, President Ilham Aliyev says that the goal of talks with Armenia is to secure the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan and to reassert the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (www.day.az/articles/rm.html), that Armenia discriminates at home. (www.day.az/news/politics/103874.html), and that the struggle for Karabakh is not over. (www.day.az/news/politics/104407.html)

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Ilham Aliyev delivers an address on Azerbaijan's contribution to meeting the energy needs of Europe. (http://www.1news.az/articles.php?item_id=20080124065429260&sec_id=2)

In an op-ed article entitled "The Caspian Moment" published in New York's *Wall Street Journal* on January 21, Foreign Minister Elmar Mamadyarov outlines Azerbaijan's views on the path forward to a resolution of the Karabakh conflict. (online.wsj.com/article/SB120087666065304071.html?mod=opinion_main_europe_asia)

In an interview conducted by Baku's Zerkalo newspaper, Deputy Foreign Minister Hafiz Pashayev discusses the current and future role of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy where he serves as rector. (www.zerkalo.az/rubric.php?id=29350)

II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan

In an interview carried on Azerbaijan television, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. National Security Advisor, praises Azerbaijan's economic and political progress. (www.islamnews.ru/news-8959.html)

During his visit to Baku, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar welcomes Azerbaijan's recent economic and political achievements. (www.day.az/news/politics/104112.html)

An American Jewish activist writes in an American newspaper that Azerbaijanis are among the most tolerant people in the world. (www.day.az/news/society/103781.html)

UN World Food Program says that the Azerbaijani government now provides more assistance to its internally displaced persons and refugees than does any other state or organization. (<http://www.day.az/news/society/104088.html>)

Moscow State University scholar assesses Russian government's approach to the Karabakh problem and the prospects for the resolution of that dispute. (<http://www.ia-centr.ru/expert/225/>)

Ukrainian website features detailed study on the evolution of relations between Baku and Kyiv. (http://www.islam.in.ua/4/rus/full_articles/1272/visibletype/1/index.html)

London's *Financial Times* publishes articles on Azerbaijan's accomplishments and the challenges it faces. (<http://www.day.az/news/politics/105547.html>).

III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

30 January

Azerbaijani parliamentarians take part in 7th Organization of the Islamic Conference Parliamentary Union in Cairo

29 January

U.S. Senator Richard Lugar introduces a bill to lift Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions on Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan-Russian border demarcation talks held in Moscow
Azerbaijani, Polish ombudsmen sign cooperation agreement
World Health Organization Chief Margaret Chen visits Baku

28-29 January

Azerbaijan-Lithuania Business Council meets in Baku

28 January

Azerbaijan-Latvian Intergovernmental Economic Cooperation Commission meets in Riga

23-27 January

President Ilham Aliyev takes part in World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, meets 15 foreign leaders, including the president of Ukraine, the president of Switzerland, the Hungarian prime minister, the president of the African National Congress, the U.S. secretary of state, the Israeli foreign minister, and other senior officials

25 January

Prime Minister Rasizade receives South Korean vice president

Finnish parliamentary delegation visits Baku

24 January

Azerbaijan and Turkey sign agreement on broadcasting Turkish television channel TRT in Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan Economic Development Minister Heydar Babayev discusses trade relations with Latvian officials in Riga

23 January

Azerbaijan names its first ambassador to Iraq, who will be resident in Amman

22 January

President Ilham Aliyev grants interview to Japan's Panorama Reports

President Mukhu Aliyev of Dagestan arrives in Azerbaijan for a visit

IAEA Coordinator for Azerbaijan Andrei Chubov visits Baku

21 January

Azerbaijani parliamentarian Samed Seidov elected vice president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

PACE observer co-chairmen arrive in Baku

20 January

President Ilham Aliyev leads the national day of mourning on the 18th anniversary of Black January, the Soviet attack on Baku

Prime Minister Rasizade represents Azerbaijan at the inauguration of Mikheil Saakashvili as president of Georgia

18 January

President Aliyev receives Minsk Group co-chairmen on their return from Yerevan

17 January

The OIC announces that Baku has been chosen as the Islamic Cultural Capital of the World for 2009

GUAM pushes for PACE resolution on frozen conflicts

President Ilham Aliyev while on visit to front reaffirms that Karabakh will always be part of Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan Economic Cooperation Commission meets in Ashgabat

16 January

President Aliyev signs decree on the establishment of a branch of Moscow State University in Baku

Azerbaijani border guards announce shift to NATO standards

14 January

President Ilham Aliyev meets Minsk Group co-chairmen

President Ilham Aliyev receives US Congressional delegation led by Senator Richard Lugar

GUAM General Secretary Valeriy Chechelashvili visits Baku

11 January

Azerbaijani, Iranian and Russian narcotics officers break up a major drug smuggling ring

10 January

Lt.Gen. Elchin Guliyev, head of State Border Service, says Baku and Moscow will complete delimitation of border in 2008

9 January

Azerbaijan Led All Countries in Economic Growth Rate in 2007, World Bank says

President Ilham Aliyev receives U.S. Congressional delegation led by Rep. Robert Wechsler

European Union welcomes Baku's amnesty of five journalists

Russian government sends two million U.S. dollars to help in IDPs in Azerbaijan

8 January

President Ilham Aliyev congratulates Mikheil Saakashvili on his election as president of Georgia

7 January 2008

Azerbaijan dispatches additional peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan

Note to Readers

The editors of "Azerbaijan in the World" hope that you find it useful and encourage you to submit your comments and articles via email (adabiweekly@ada.edu.az). The materials it contains reflect the personal views of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy or the Ministry of the Republic of Azerbaijan.